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From Brain Drain to 
Brain Competition
Changing Opportunities 
and the Career Patterns of 
US-  Trained Korean Academics
Sunwoong Kim
10.1    Introduction
As other chapters in this volume have shown, many students around the 
world are coming to the U.S. universities to study, and some of them return 
to their native countries, while others stay in the United States. More and 
more PhDs, particularly in science and engineering (S&E), are awarded to 
foreign nationals, particularly from the students from China, India, and 
Korea, and they are becoming a major component of the research activi-
ties of the U.S. universities. Currently, the majority of Chinese and Indian 
PhDs intend to stay in the United States after their graduation.1 However, 
based on the experience of Korean PhDs trained in the United States, it 
is not clear this pattern will continue into the future, raising the question 
whether and how the U.S. research universities will continually maintain 
their preeminence. The Korean experience shows that the situation in the 
home country plays a decisive role in determining the career choice of those 
foreign- born  talents.
Clearly, PhDs are the core resource in research and development activi-
ties, and where and how they work will determine the eﬀectiveness of not 
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1. According to the 2006 Survey of Earned Doctorates, among 45,596 doctorates awarded in 
the United States, about one-  third (15,916) were awarded to foreign nationals. In engineering, 
the share of foreign nationals was 63 percent, and in physical science 53 percent. Chinese are 
the largest group with 4,774 degrees, followed by Indians with 1,742, then followed by Koreans 
with 1,648. 89.8 percent of Chinese, 88.1 percent of Indian, and 60.9 percent of Korean said 
they intended to stay in the United States (Hoﬀer et al. 2007). The share of the people who 
intended to stay has increased over time recently, but the trend reﬂ  ects the increasing number 
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only the higher education sector but also the national innovation system 
as a whole. The decision of those people to stay or return to their native 
country will depend on several professional and personal considerations. In 
this paper, we examine employment opportunities and career patterns of the 
U.S.- trained Korean PhDs in academia over the past several decades. Korea 
is an interesting country to study the employment and residence choice of 
the U.S.-  trained highly skilled knowledge workers. Over the last ﬁ  fty years, 
Korea has transformed itself from a low- income agrarian country to a ﬂ  edg-
ling advanced economy. Consequently, the Korean labor market situation 
for academics has changed signiﬁ  cantly. In fact, the desirability of staying 
in the United States after gradation has changed signiﬁ  cantly due to the 
Korean government’s policy as well as the forces of internationalization in 
higher education and the globalization of the professorial market. The pur-
pose of this paper is to highlight the changes in government policies, institu-
tional arrangements, and market forces in Korean higher education system, 
and relate them to the employment choices and career patterns of the U.S.-
  trained Korean academics.
If one examines the post-  Korean War period from the perspective of 
employment choice of the U.S.-  trained Korean academics, three diﬀerent 
periods can be identiﬁ  ed: brain drain (1953– 1970), brain gain (1970– 1997), 
and brain competition (since 1979). The ﬁ  rst period is typical of low- income 
countries: talented Korean students left for the United States to study 
abroad and stayed there after their education and training by being de facto 
immigrants. In the second period, a large number of Korean graduate stu-
dents came to the United States for advanced degrees and returned to seek 
lucrative employment opportunities in the burgeoning Korean economy. 
During this period, Korea eﬀectively outsourced its graduate education 
to the United States. In the third period, more U.S.-  trained Korean PhDs 
sought employment opportunities outside of Korea. The professorial mar-
ket became more globalized, and their midcareer movements were more 
diverse and complex. The Korean academic labor market became more 
competitive as a result of the greater supply of PhDs and the adaptation 
of merit-  based personnel policies. Also, the competition among elite uni-
versities to seek world-  class status became more evident, and they actively 
recruited midcareer researchers working in the United States. At the same 
time, there has been an increase of migration of Korean- educated postdocs 
to the United States. More professional cooperation and competition for 
and among talents across borders are emerging.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the large 
presence of Koreans in U.S. higher education and the large inﬂ  uence of U.S.-
  trained academics in Korean higher education. In section 10.3, historical 
context before the Korean War (1950–  1953) explaining the close relation-
ship between Korean and U.S. higher education is provided. In section 10.4, 
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discuss how Korea used the brain gain (1970– 1997) of the Korean expatriate 
for economic development and increasing the capacity of the Korean higher 
education sector. At the same time, we highlight the structural character-
istics of the academic job market and explain why the Korean model of 
brain gain worked but could not be sustained. In section 10.7, we discuss 
the emerging trend of increased competition and mass internationalization 
of higher education since the Asian economic crisis (1997). We highlight 
the private and public responses to the changing market environment re-
sulting in global brain competition. Finally, in the conclusion, we discuss 
the implications of this new trend of global brain competition to American 
universities.
10.2      The Importance of Korea and the United States 
in Each Others’ Higher Education Sector
According to the data provided by the U.S. Institute of International 
Education, there were 564,766 foreign students enrolled in higher educa-
tion institutions in the United States in the academic year of 2005 to 2006 
(Institute of International Education [IIE] various years). There were 58,847 
Korean students in the same year, representing 10.5 percent of all foreign 
students. Korea ranks third in terms of the number of students in U.S. higher 
education, following India with 76,503 students and China with 62,582 stu-
dents. Considering the fact that both China and India have much bigger 
populations, Korea sends the most students per capita to the United States 
in the world. Among them, 46 percent are registered in undergraduate pro-
grams, 41 percent in graduate programs, and the rest in special programs. 
In addition to the students enrolled in the regular academic programs, there 
are about 10,000 Korean students studying in intensive English programs 
in the United States. Currently, Korea sends the largest number of students 
to the United States for English language training in the world, followed 
by Japan, which used to occupy the top position until recently.
Korean presence in U.S. higher education is prominent at the doctorate 
level as well. According to the 2006 Survey of Earned Doctorates, the num-
ber of PhDs awarded to Korean nationals was 1,648, only outranked by 
China (4,774) and India (1,742; Hoﬀer et al. 2007). Despite the large supply 
of PhDs, the number of Korean faculty members in American Universities 
is relatively small. The 2008 Directory of the Korean American University 
Professors Association (KAUPA) lists about 2,500 faculty members work-
ing in North America, and the majority of them are in the United States. 
While this number is relatively small, it has been growing rapidly for the 
last ten years due to the changes in the Korean and world academic labor 
markets. In addition, there are about 8,000 Korean visiting scholars and 
substantial number of Korean postdocs in U.S. universities.
On the other side of the ledger, the presence of U.S. universities in the 338    Sunwoong  Kim
Korean higher education sector is also quite remarkable. Among Korean 
academics working in Korea who received their PhDs abroad, the United 
States is the biggest contributor. According to the data provided by the 
Korean Research Foundation, 52.8 percent Korean researchers with foreign 
PhDs who registered their degree during the period between January 2000 
and August 2007 at the Foundation received their degrees in the United 
States. Following the United States, the proportion of Japanese PhDs ac-
counts for 17.7 percent, followed by Germany (7.1 percent), the United 
Kingdom (5.5 percent), and China (4.6 percent). (Dong- A  Daily, October 
24, 2007). Because these data are based on self- reporting and ignore the fact 
that many U.S. PhDs don’t tend to return to Korea immediately after their 
degree (compared to the degree recipients from other countries), the U.S. 
proportion is likely to be higher.
Currently, U.S. PhDs dominate the professorial positions in Korean uni-
versities. The pattern is most striking in top-  rank universities. In Seoul 
National University, 886 out of 1,683 professors with PhDs (52.6 per-
cent) received their PhDs in the United States. Some disciplines have much 
higher proportions than others. In general, management, social sciences, 
natural sciences, and engineering have higher proportions of U.S. PhDs 
than humanities, law, medicine, and nursing. Almost 90 percent of business 
school faculty members have U.S. PhDs. In social sciences, the proportion 
is 78.8 percent, in natural sciences 77.6 percent, in engineering 76.8 percent, 
and in biological and life sciences 76.8 percent. (Chosun Daily, October 18, 
2007). The other two premier science and engineering universities in Korea, 
Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) and Pohang 
School of Technology (POSTECH), also have a very high proportion of 
U.S. PhDs. At KAIST, 84 out of 101 (83.2 percent) science professors and 
170 out of 239 (71.1 percent) engineering professors received their PhDs in 
the United States. At POSTECH, 73 out of 81 (90.1 percent) science profes-
sors and 99 out of 120 (82.5 percent) engineering professors received their 
PhDs in the United States (data from KCUE Faculty Directory of Universi-
ties in Korea, 2004). Beyond their sheer number, the U.S.- trained academics 
form the basic tenets and methodology of many academic disciplines (e.g., 
see Choi [1997] on the inﬂ  uence of U.S.-  trained academics on economic 
science in Korea).
In the second-  tier universities, the proportion of U.S.-  trained PhDs is 
smaller. For example, at Hanyang University, a private university whose 
overall ranking in Korea is around ﬁ  ve or seven among all Korean universi-
ties, 41.1 percent of professors in sciences and 40.3 percent in engineering 
are U.S. PhDs. At Kyunghee University, another private university whose 
overall ranking is around ten, 43.4 percent of science professors and 33.3 
percent of engineering professors are from the United States. At Kyungbook 
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percent of science professors and 27.9 percent of engineering professors 
received their PhDs from major U.S. universities.
10.3      Historical Legacy (from Late Nineteenth 
Century to the Korean War, 1950–  1953)
It is natural to wonder why Korea, a relatively small country located far 
away from the U.S. mainland, has such a strong relationship with the U.S. 
higher education system. In order to answer this question, one needs to 
start with longer and broader historical backgrounds since the beginning 
of modern education in Korea. The American inﬂ  uence started in the nine-
teenth century when several U.S. missionaries established several modern 
higher education institutions in Korea. During the Japanese colonial period 
(1910–  1945), the United States provided a safe haven for overseas Korean 
expatriates working for Korean independence. More direct and stronger 
inﬂ  uence started in the aftermath of World War II and the Korean War, 
when the United States took a great part in Korean politics and national 
security. Since then, the Korean higher education system has been heavily 
inﬂ  uenced by U.S.-  trained academics (Lee 1989).
During the period between 1880 and 1910, when the Chosun Dynasty 
struggled to cope with the encroachment of the powerful imperialistic na-
tions of the period, the student ﬂ  ow to the United States was minimal be-
cause of the obvious diﬃculty of traveling the long distance between the 
nations at that time. Most foreign cultural and intellectual inﬂ  uence from 
advanced nations was through the students who studied in neighboring 
Japan and China. However, American missionaries during the time period 
actively participated in the beginning of modern education in Korea by 
establishing higher education institutions. Many such institutions, such 
as Yonsei University, Soongsil University, and Ewha Womans University, 
are still in existence today and constitute top-  rung private universities in 
Korea.
During Japan’s forced annexation of Korea between 1910 and 1945, the 
development of modern education in Korea was severely suppressed by the 
colonial government. For the ﬁ  rst twenty-  ﬁ  ve years of the colonial rule, 
no universities were allowed in the Korean peninsula, and all institutions 
of higher learning were converted to technical colleges in order to provide 
technical manpower necessary in governing the colony. Most top Korean 
students who wanted to further their study went to Japan for several rea-
sons. First, Japan was the colonial power, and the elites who were attached 
to the colonial government were favored in Japan, and their children were 
welcome in Japanese higher education institutions. Second, as the economic 
and social ties between Japan and its Korean territory increased, more infor-
mation regarding study in Japan was available to the potential students. 340    Sunwoong  Kim
However, there were only a few dozen Koreans in the U.S. universities at 
any given time until 1940s.2 However, the United States provided an alter-
native to Japan to those who overtly or covertly worked for Korean inde-
pendence. For those students, Japan was a dangerous place, and the United 
States provided a safe haven for their independence activities. In contrast 
to the education in Japan, which stressed the importance of the national 
power and the collective ethos, American social philosophy was based on 
individual freedom and democracy. Therefore, the philosophy and attitude 
of the Korean students in the United States were very diﬀerent from those 
in Japan regarding Japanese colonialism and Korean nationalism.
The victory of the United States over Japan in World War II gave the 
scholars and leaders who were trained in the United States a great deal of 
leverage, and they often served as the conduit of the American policy toward 
the occupied land. In fact, many of those who studied in the United States 
felt quite strongly about such social responsibility. The list of the Who’s 
Who in the independence movement and early Korean government, busi-
ness, and social leaders were dominated by those who studied in the United 
States during the colonial period (e.g., Ahn Chang-  Ho, Rhee Syngman, 
Ahn Ick- Tae, Yeom Sang- Seop, Cheon Young- Taek, Paik Nack- Jun, Helen 
Kim, Yun Chi- Young, Hong Nan- Pa, and so on). In particular, Rhee Syung-
man, who studied at Harvard and Princeton, mobilized Koreans in Hawaii 
for the nation’s independence movement during the Japanese colonial pe-
riod and became the ﬁ  rst president of the newly independent South Korea 
in 1948. Despite the large inﬂ  uence of the U.S.- educated Korean leaders, the 
number of Koreans who were exposed to U.S. universities was very small. 
However, the outbreak of the Korean War (1950– 1953) and the U.S. military 
involvement in the war changed the picture dramatically.
10.4      Brain Drain: The First Wave of Study Abroad (1953–  1970)
Figure 10.1 depicts the changes in the number of Korean students in 
U.S. higher education institutions since 1954, the ﬁ  rst year that the Insti-
tute of International Education (IIE) started to keep track of the statistics. 
According to the ﬁ  gure, there were two major waves of study abroad in 
the United States by Koreans. The ﬁ  rst wave, a relatively small one, started 
immediately after the Korean War. The second wave, a major wave that 
started around 1980, does not show any sign of slow down despite a tempo-
rary setback during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 to 1999. However, 
the nature of the study in the United States and the behavior of the students 
in the two waves are quite diﬀerent from one another. The ﬁ  rst wave was a 
typical brain drain in which talented students went to the United States and 
2. Around 1930, it was reported that there were about 300 Korean students in the U.S. higher 
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stayed there after their education and training by being de facto immigrants. 
The second wave is a large-  scale internationalization of higher education 
between Korea and the United States.
During the ﬁ  rst wave, increasing numbers of Koreans started to come to 
the United States for study abroad. Motivations and ﬁ  nancial support for 
those students were quite diverse. Some students were sent by the Rhee gov-
ernment. Any students who planned to go overseas to study were exempted 
from the mandatory military service. The Rhee government wanted to use 
them as a vehicle for technology transfer in order to reconstruct and develop 
the war- torn nation. Most of these students concentrated in graduate stud-
ies in S&E. Some students were supported by the U.S. government, including 
Fulbright Scholarships and East-  West Center Fellowships. Some students 
were adopted or sponsored by American soldiers and missionaries, whose 
number increased dramatically since the Korean War. Some were ﬁ  nanced 
by their own families.
In any case, many bright Korean students who ﬁ  nished their advanced 
degree in the United States ended up settling down in the United States. This 
phenomenon was particularly keen in the science and engineering ﬁ  elds, 
where scholarships for graduate students and employment opportunities in 
the United States after graduation were much more abundant. Korea lost 
these talented people for two major reasons.
First, there was a large diﬀerence in living standards between the United 
States and Korea. Figure 10.2 shows the relative income between Korea and 
Fig. 10.1    Korean students in U.S. higher education
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the United States between 1960 and 2007. The ratio of the Korean gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita to the U.S. GDP per capita was calcu-
lated using the oﬃcial exchange rate and purchasing power parity (PPP). 
The graph using the exchange rate is more volatile of the two because of 
the exchange rate ﬂ  uctuation as Korea has maintained the managed ﬂ  exible 
exchange rate regime since the late 1960s. The ﬁ  gure shows that the relative 
income between the two countries remained pretty stable up until 1967 
(3–  5 percent using the exchange rate and 11 percent using PPP). Since the 
late 1960s, the relative income has steadily increased to around 45 percent 
until the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 to 1998. After this signiﬁ  cant nega-
tive shock, the Korean economy recovered fairly quickly, and the relative 
income reached about 54 percent in 2007. Rapidly rising income in Korea 
certainly had an important inﬂ  uence on the return decisions of the students 
in the later period, which will be discussed later.
The second reason for the drain was the lack of professional opportunity, 
due to the underdevelopment of research infrastructure in Korea. When the 
student returned to Korea after the successful study, he or she would ﬁ  nd 
that the working conditions in Korea were much inferior to the ones in the 
United States. Even if the student were ﬁ  nanced by the government and 
were obligated to return home, the government found it diﬃcult to place 
the returnee. Consequently, the returnee was often forced to work in a ﬁ  eld 
diﬀerent from his or her specialization or went back to the United States.
It is diﬃcult to obtain quantitative measures of the extent of the brain 
Fig. 10.2    The ratio of per capita GDP between Korea and the United States
Sources: http:/  /  www.NationMaster.com and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.From Brain Drain to Brain Competition: US-Trained Korean Academics    3 4 3
drain in this period. However, the pattern is not very diﬀerent from the 
current brain drain of highly educated and trained professionals from low- 
income countries to high- income countries, widely observed in many coun-
tries (Beine, Docquier, and Rapport 2001; Kao and Lee 1973; Kwok and 
Leland 1982; Wong and Yip 1999; Katz and Stark 1984).3 In the case of 
Korea, however, its brain drain was not a total waste. Rather, it can be re-
garded as a “brain saving” because some of the expatriate Korean talents 
were eﬀectively mobilized during the subsequent push for rapid economic 
growth and the expansion of the higher education sector.
10.5    Brain  Gain  (1970–  1997)
10.5.1      Human Capital and Economic Growth in Korea
In explaining the Korea’s successful economic development experience 
since early 1960s, economists usually point out several reasons. Rapid expan-
sion of production capacity through heavy investment in capital goods and 
infrastructure, stable governments, high domestic savings rates, disciplined 
Confucian work ethic, and well-  timed government-  led economic policies 
have been often cited as the major determinants of Korea’s high growth 
rates (e.g., Amsden 1989; Song 1997). However, the accumulation of Korea’s 
human capital has been relatively ignored in the discussion of Korea’s suc-
cessful economic development process.
Domestically, when the Park Chung-  Hee Administration (1961–  1979) 
started to implement the government-  led economic development plan, 
Korea was already prepared with quite substantial human resources as 
a result of more than a decade of intensive human capital investment by 
the previous administration. Immediately after independence, the previous 
Rhee Syngman Administration (1948–  1960) pushed for universal primary 
school education under the guidance of American education planners 
(McGinn 1980). Although the eﬀort had been seriously jeopardized by the 
outbreak of the Korean War, the successful postwar implementation of 
universal primary schooling increased the primary school enrollment from 
1.37 million students in 1945 to 2.27 million in 1947 to 4.94 million in 1965. 
Despite the substantial foreign aid provided by the United States, Rhee’s 
government failed to establish a peaceful and prosperous economy, due to 
widespread corruption among its political elite and political instability. But 
its legacy of expanding universal primary education paid oﬀ handsomely 
several years later. The number of teachers increased from 20,000 in 1945 
to 79,000 in 1965. By 1965, the goal of universal primary school education 
3. 63 percent of foreign-  born students who earned science and engineering doctorates from 
U.S. institutions between 1988 and 1996 said they planned to locate in the United States. Two-
  thirds of those who planned to stay had ﬁ  rm plans for further study or employment (Johnson 
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had been more or less achieved, and the human resources for Park’s export 
promotion policies by specializing labor intensive manufacturing industries 
were already in place (Korean Ministry of Education and Human Resources 
1998).
The second important aspect of human capital resources in that era was 
the availability of highly educated people that assumed leadership roles in 
Korean economy. Many of these people received advanced degrees in the 
United States. The Korean government did not pursue a systematic policy 
of “learning from the West” that the Meiji government of Japan adopted 
in the middle of nineteenth century. However, many Korean talents went 
to the United States for advanced study through personal and religious af-
ﬁ  liations because the United States was heavily involved in the Korean War 
and the reconstruction eﬀorts afterward. As early as 1953, the number of 
Korean students enrolled in U.S. higher education jumped to around 2,000 
to 3,000 (IIE various year). During the 1950s, there were about 50,000 to 
60,000 foreign students in the United States, and Korean students accounted 
about 5 to 6 percent of them. Surprisingly, Korea ranked between ﬁ  fth and 
tenth in terms of the number of students enrolled in U.S. higher education 
in the late 1950s despite the lower income and relatively small population. 
When the Park Administration set the goal of economic development by 
recruiting U.S.-  trained engineers and economists, there were already sub-
stantial numbers of Korean expatriate professionals in the United States.4
10.5.2      Push for Brain Gain
As a part of economic development strategy, the Park Administration 
actively recruited and utilized the U.S.-  trained knowledge workers. For ex-
ample, in 1966, the Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) was 
established, and wholesale recruitment of Korean scientists and engineers 
from abroad, particularly from the United States, began.5 The Korea De-
velopment Institute (KDI) was established in 1971 in order to advise the 
government for the active economic planning exercise. To launch these in-
stitutions, which were created outside of the existing universities and other 
government agencies, their presidents began by recruiting qualiﬁ  ed sci-
entists, engineers, and economists who could lead their research groups. 
Salaries were set much higher than the local pay level. Generous allowances 
for research equipment and assistants were provided. In addition, modern 
housing and educational allowance for their children were provided (Yoon 
1992; Song 1997).
From the perspective of Korean PhDs in the United States, such job oﬀers 
presented opportunities as well as substantial risks. On the one hand, they 
4. See Kapur (2001) and Vasegh-  Daneshvary, Schlottmann, and Herzog (1987) for interna-
tional migration of professionals and technology transfer.
5. Major funding for the establishment of KIST was provided by the Johnson Administration 
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presented a great opportunity to go back home and contribute to the devel-
opment of the homeland. Although the working conditions and the mate-
rial reward were comparable to the existing jobs in the United States, the 
positions oﬀered more professional freedom because they were given wider 
and greater responsibility. There was a certain personal satisfaction about 
being able use their knowledge and skills in promoting the welfare of the 
people in the homeland. Also, being able to be close to relatives (particu-
larly aging parents) and friends was a plus. On the other hand, there were 
certain personal and professional risks. Other family members, particularly 
young children, might not adjust well to Korean society and be unhappy 
about the move back. Professionally, the move could lead to a dead-  end 
career prospect and loss of valuable professional connections in the United 
States. Based on this obvious trade-  oﬀ, not all expatriates welcomed such 
oﬀers. But some were willing to take the risk and come back to Korea in 
such an environment.
Overall, the government-  sponsored institutions were a great success. 
The institutions were able to recruit enough expatriates to Korea, and 
the returnees were able to contribute greatly to the scientiﬁ  c, engineering, 
and economic progress (Song 1997; Yoon 1992). Observing the success of 
government-  sponsored research institutes, universities and private ﬁ  rms 
also participated in the recruitment of the U.S.-  trained talents. Because the 
supply of talents was rather limited, their labor market return was quite 
high. Such a positive market signal for the U.S.-  educated professionals and 
rising income in Korea created a bonanza of going to the United States for 
the purpose of studying. Having seen the successful career developments of 
the U.S.-  trained professionals, large-  scale study abroad started.
With the strong market signal, many bright young people leave Korea to 
study in the United States. Some of them may end up staying in the United 
States because of its superior working conditions and quality of life. How-
ever, if the Korean economy provided high enough incentives, a majority of 
these talents would come back to Korea. The high incentives of the returnee 
created strong incentives for more young people to go to the United States. 
In eﬀect, Korea virtually outsourced its graduate education to the United 
States. As long as the incentive existed, the process of brain gain continued. 
In Korean universities, the U.S.-  educated PhDs started to ﬁ  ll many profes-
sorial positions in Korea. Following their favorite professors’ advice, the 
brightest students who aspire to obtain advanced degrees go abroad, and 
the United States has been the most popular destination for those expecting 
to obtain a professorial position in Korea (Mountford 1997). In 1999, about 
80 percent of 40,000 full-  time faculty members in Korean universities have 
doctoral degrees, and about 50 percent of them earned PhDs from abroad, 
with 67.2 percent of the foreign doctorates being from the United States 
(Korean Council for University Education 2000). This ratio is undoubtedly 
higher among younger faculty members.346    Sunwoong  Kim
There are several reasons that the Korean government’s initiative to invite 
back the high-  skilled expatriates was successful. First, the timing of the 
recruitment strategy worked out well. There was enough supply of highly 
educated and skilled Korean knowledge workers in the United States already 
so that there were enough people who would be willing to return despite 
the risks mentioned in the preceding. Second, the success of the subse-
quent economic growth for an extended period gave enough conﬁ  dence to 
the potential returnees. Third, the size of the recruitment was substantial 
enough so that the potential recruit felt that he or she was not alone, and 
the community of returnees can form a community to support one another 
in Korea. Fourth, the stronger political and military ties between Korea 
and the United States due to Korea’s participation in the Vietnam War gave 
conﬁ  dence to the Korean government oﬃcials as well as to the returnees. 
Fifth, the government was able to provide special privileges and much higher 
compensation to the returnees than existing domestic workers as they were 
absorbed to the newly created institutions rather than the existing ones.
10.5.3      Professorial Market in Korea and Brain Gain
During the Park Administration (1961–  1979), the expansion of higher 
education in Korea was heavily suppressed. During the administration, the 
enrollment in secondary schools increased more than ﬁ  ve times; the gradu-
ates are encouraged to follow technical careers after their graduation ra-
ther than advancing to universities. In the previous Rhee Administration, 
the higher education sector was left to the market. With little government 
support and supervision, the sector was expanded mainly by proﬁ  t-  seeking 
academic entrepreneurs. Consequently, a substantial part of the private 
higher education sector was plagued with low quality and corruption. Al-
though all the private universities in Korea are de jure nonproﬁ  t institutions, 
many behave like de facto for-  proﬁ  t institutions on behalf of the founder’s 
family.
The Park government that obtained the power through a military coup 
was trying to gain legitimacy by cleaning up the corruption. Heavy regula-
tion toward the higher education sector was adopted as an anticorruption 
measure. For example, individual institutions are required to obtain speciﬁ  c 
permission by the government in order to increase the size of the department 
within the institution. Moreover, the economic development plan during the 
Park Administration called for the rapid increase in the supply of semiskilled 
production workers. Meanwhile, professors and students in universities were 
regarded as trouble makers to the government because of their incessant 
criticism and protests against the dictatorial government.
The natural consequence of the enrollment quota in higher education and 
restricted supply of university- educated workers was a large wage premium 
for university graduates. As the government’s support for higher education 
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Korean universities. Naturally, households are required to bear the bulk 
of the higher education expenditure, and student tuition and fees were set 
relatively high. At the same time, Korean universities have enjoyed the free-
dom to choose students albeit the government’s heavy regulations on the 
methods of student selection. As a result of the freedom and the competi-
tion among students, universities have a well-  known pecking order.6 As the 
perceived monetary and social gain for the elite universities was high, the 
competition to enter universities in Korea was extremely ﬁ  erce even with 
high tuition payment.
The phenomenon of brain gain made the pursuit of graduate education, 
in particular PhD programs in top American universities, even more desir-
able. An advanced degree was regarded as an important credential for pro-
fessorial positions, and this credential was more important than teaching 
and research performance. As we shall discuss in the following, professors 
in Korean universities are granted de facto tenure when they are hired, and 
salaries and promotions are mostly determined by years on the job. Their 
salaries were quite high, and the job security was extremely high. Conse-
quently, professorial positions were very desirable. The mandatory retire-
ment age for professors was sixty- ﬁ  ve, which was ﬁ  ve to ten years later than 
most private- sector jobs. While their teaching load was typically higher than 
U.S. norms (typically nine credit hours per semester in research universities 
and twelve credit hours in teaching schools), compared with private-  sector 
employees in Korea, their working lives were much more pleasant.7
Until 1975, Korean professorial positions were well protected. The 
Korean Constitution and higher education related laws guarantee the in-
dependence of higher education institutions, and academic staﬀs in those 
institutions enjoyed de facto tenure when they were appointed as a full- time 
lecturer, both in public and private universities.8 They move up to the rank 
of assistant professor, associate professor, and professor over time. There 
were part-  time lecturers as well, but they were subject to one-   or two-  year 
limited time appointments.
In 1975, the dictatorial government introduced a reappointment system 
for university personnel. Professors and associate professors were supposed 
to be reappointed every six to ten years, and assistant professors and full-
6. Lee and Brinton (1996) examined how university prestige generates advantage for entry 
into the labor market. Social background of the new job seeker does not directly inﬂ  uence the 
job search outcome, but institutional social capital (the help of the placement oﬃce, professors, 
or friends and alum) play an important role.
7. Korea has by far the longest working hours among OECD countries.
8. The Korean university system has public universities and private universities. Most of the 
public universities are national universities that are run by the Ministry of Education. Other 
public universities are run by local governments and other government agencies. Private uni-
versities (some with religious aﬃliations and others independent) are governed by the board of 
trustees. The Korean higher education system is dominated by private universities, and about 
three-  quarters of university students are enrolled in private universities. See S. Kim (2008) for 
more detail on Korean higher education system.348    Sunwoong  Kim
  time lecturers every two to three years. Although the stated objective of 
the new system was to sanction academic staﬀ who were not doing their 
jobs properly, the real motivation was to control one of the most vocal and 
inﬂ  uential social groups opposing the dictatorship, professors. While some 
politically active professors failed to be reappointed, the number of them 
not reappointed was in fact extremely small. Between 1975 and 1999, only 
226 professors failed to be reappointed, and 115 universities did not have a 
single case of no reappointment (Lee and Im 2000; Ham and Hong 2007; 
Seo, Jeong, and Kwak 2000).
In 1987, the dictatorial government backed by the military gave away to 
a democratically elected government. As part of the regime change, stu-
dents and faculty members had struggled for a more democratic internal and 
external governance of the universities. The new government changed the 
appointment of presidents in national universities to direct election by the 
full-  time regular faculty members. In private universities, while the boards 
of trustees still appointed the president, the faculty council gained a stronger 
voice against the administration.
Korean professors have been relatively well-  paid as well. In 1990, the 
average salary of full professors was 27 million Korean won (about 5.5 
times the GDP per capita), and that of full-  time lecturers was 16.7 million 
won (about 3.5 times the GDP per capita). Professors in private universities 
were paid, on average, about 10 percent more than those in public universi-
ties. Most universities have a seniority-  based salary system, that is, salary 
is mostly determined by the years on the job. While there is a component 
based on the performance and the area of specialty, the diﬀerence is mar-
ginal. For example, in 1995, the average salary of professors in humanities 
and social science was 42 million won, science and engineering 39 million, 
and medical science 44 million based on the salary survey done by Kim 
(1996). In 2000, the average salary at the rank of full professor was $40,422; 
associate professor, $33,231; assistant professor, $28,948; and instructor, 
$24,305 (Lee 2003).
Performance played very little role in determining the salary. The total 
compensation includes a substantial amount of various nontaxable com-
ponents, including a research fund, which ranges from 10 to 30 percent of 
the total compensation, children’s educational expenses, and so on. The 
nonsalary components account for 40 to 60 percent of the total compensa-
tion depending on institution. There are other perks associated with being 
professors in Korea. Korean universities have a very liberal leave policy. 
Professors have been allowed to take a leave of absence for a variety of 
reasons without much penalty. For example, they commonly run for public 
oﬃces, such as members of the National Assembly or mayors. When they 
fail or decide to come back to the old position, they have been routinely 
taken back to the previous positions. Second, professors have been able to From Brain Drain to Brain Competition: US-Trained Korean Academics    3 4 9
actively participate in social and public activities. Some are paid activities 
such as consulting for the government or private ﬁ  rms or voluntary civic 
actions such as in nongovernmental organizations.
Because the professorial positions have been coveted by most PhDs, exit 
from the professorial positions to other types of jobs are extremely rare. 
According to Lee et al. (2007), out of 372 job transfers who moved out of 
industry during the period between 1994 and 2006, 47 percent moved to 
higher education institutions and 8.3 percent to research institutions, and 
the remainder to other private ﬁ  rms. Among 400 transfers out of higher edu-
cation institutions, 81 percent moved to other higher education institutions, 
12 percent to research institutes, and only 7 percent to private ﬁ  rms. Among 
233 transfers out of research institutes, 73 percent moved to higher educa-
tion institutions, 16.7 percent to research institutions, and only 9.4 percent 
to private ﬁ  rms. According to the same survey, of PhDs working in science 
and engineering ﬁ  elds, 68.3 percent received their degrees outside of Korea. 
Among the foreign PhDs, 64 percent are from the United States.
10.5.4      Brain Gain Was Not Sustainable: PhD Glut
Up until the mid-  1990s, Korea did relatively well in minimizing brain 
drain. Compared to other Asian countries such as China and India, the per-
centage of Korean PhD recipients who intended to stay in the United States 
was substantially lower. In this regard, the large inﬂ  ux of Korean students 
into the United States during this period can be regarded eﬀectively as a 
mechanism for training high- level human resources without much domestic 
investment. In particular, the Korean higher education sector had been able 
to allocate substantial human resources to professorial positions in a relative 
short time period. However, despite its strong growth, this Korean model of 
brain gain could not be sustained for an extended period. Rigid personnel 
policies in universities characterized by very low turnover rates of faculty 
members, lack of performance-  based personnel policy, and the politicized 
governance structure generated a stale system that is not ﬂ  exible enough to 
absorb the rapidly rising supply of PhDs eﬃciently.
Figure 10.3 shows the dramatic increase in the number of Korean PhDs 
received during the 1980s both in Korea and in the United States. In 1980, 
only 249 PhDs in the ﬁ  elds of humanities, social sciences, natural sciences, 
and engineering (150 of them were in natural sciences and engineering) were 
awarded in Korea. In 1990, the number reached 1,916 (1,137 in S&E). In the 
United States, the number of PhD degrees awarded to Koreans increased 
from 116 (87 in S&E) to 1,275 (767 in S&E) during the same period. This 
Korean bonanza of U.S. PhDs culminated in 1993 to 1994. In those years, 
more than 6 percent of total PhDs granted in U.S. institutions were awarded 
to Koreans. Much of this study abroad phenomenon was driven by indi-
vidual students and occurred outside of formal government programs. 350    Sunwoong  Kim
Most of the students came to the United States with temporary visas, and 
more and more students are supported by personal means since 1985 (see 
table 10.1).9
The sharp increase in the number of Korean PhDs during the period was 
due to several factors. First, the number of undergraduate students in Korea 
increased very rapidly after the late 1970s. Because of the burgeoning num-
ber of high school graduates and increasing advancement rate to universi-
ties, the government was forced to increase the quota of college enrollments. 
In 1978, the enrollment in the Korean university system was about 278,000. 
In the education reform pushed by the Chun Doo- Hwan Administration in 
1980, the quota for university students increased substantially. Due to the 
relaxation of the quota, the enrollment ﬁ  gure increased to 932,000 in 1985. 
The sharp increase in the number of undergraduate degrees created higher 
demand for graduate degrees, including the PhD.10
Second, the economic rate of return to PhD was quite high. As the num-
ber of PhDs was very small, and the higher education sector was expand-
ing quite rapidly, the domestic demand for professors was quite high. Until 
the early 1990s, despite a substantial gap in earning potential between the 
9. These ﬁ  gures include any partial supports by the university or the government.
10. See S. Kim (2008) for more on the rapid expansion of higher education in Korea.
Fig. 10.3    Number of doctorates awarded to Koreans in the United States and 
in Korea
Sources: Survey of Earned Doctorate (United States) and author’s tabulation based on the 
Korean Education Statistics Yearbook.
Note: Korean statistics do not include professional doctorate degrees such as law and medi-
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United States and Korea, many U.S.-  educated talents gladly chose a career 
in Korea because the jobs in Korea tended to be higher in status and respon-
sibility. Korean jobs tended to have more stress and longer hours, but they 
could be more fulﬁ  lling, as they carry more responsibility. Between 1965 
and 1995, the Korean economy was growing rapidly, and there was a strong 
demand for such talents as ﬁ  rms and society needed highly educated man-
power for its leadership positions. Most of the U.S.-  educated PhDs were 
able to take up such positions.
Third, as the process of brain gain continued, the number and the capacity 
of graduate faculty increased within Korean universities. Most of the faculty 
members in top Korean universities have PhDs from elite universities around 
the world, particularly from the United States. Consequently, more graduate 
programs were established domestically, and the number of PhDs awarded 
by those institutions started to increase rapidly.
Given the low turnover among professors due to de facto tenure at hire, 
the supply of PhDs quickly outnumbered the domestic demand. During the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, it became evident that the job prospects for new 
PhDs dimmed as the number of U.S.-  educated PhDs grew rapidly. More 
graduate students then wanted to stay in Korea for their PhD in order not 
to lose contact with the professors who could help in securing teaching posi-
tions. Also, the quality of faculty and graduate education in Korea improved 
substantially, thanks to the quality of the new faculty and the establishment 
of graduate and research-  oriented universities. Consequently, the relative 
attractiveness of pursuing a PhD in Korea (vis-  à-  vis in the United States) 
increased substantially. At the same time, the Korean government provided 
military service exemptions to those who pursue graduate education in 
Table 10.1  Statistical proﬁ  les of Korean doctorates received in the United States
    1975  1980  1985  1990   1995   2000
Total number of PhDs earned 190 158 392 1,259 1,306 1,048
Natural Science and Engineering (%) 59.5 55.0 64.2 60.9 52.4 53.2
Social Science including Psychology (%) 21.6 28.5 18.7 16.9 24.6 18.0
Humanities, Education, and Professional (%) 18.9 16.5 17.1 22.2 23.0 28.8
Some personal ﬁ  nancial support (%) 44.2 53.8 79.7 72.4 74.1 96.5
With permanent visa (%) 36.3 21.5 12.0 5.6 10.0 9.7
Intend to stay in the United Statesa (%) 46.8 48.5 33.5 31.5 38.7 64.1
Firm plans to stay in the United Statesa (%) 37.7 40.9 25.8 23.0 20.9 42.9
No. with ﬁ  rm plan to staya 58 54 84 225 210 320
No. with ﬁ  rm employmenta 35 21 31  68  35 115
Postdoca 23 33 53 157 175 205
Educational institutiona 13  6 12  30  18  29
Industry/businessa   20   12   16    31    15    82
Source: Johnson (1998).
aOnly for science and engineering (including social sciences).352    Sunwoong  Kim
Korea.11 Because of all these factors, the number of graduate students and 
PhDs awarded in Korea has risen rapidly since 1985. As shown in table 
10.2, the number of doctoral-  level degrees (PhDs and professional doctor-
ate degrees including law, medicine, and so on) awarded in Korea increased 
from only about 400 in 1970 to 9,314 in 2006.
As the supply of qualiﬁ  ed PhDs increased, many of them with degrees 
from top-  notch universities around the world, Korean universities could 
aﬀord to be choosier over time. Universities tended to look for PhDs from 
higher ranking universities over time. As the supply of PhDs from top uni-
versities became more plentiful, universities could consider not only the 
university from which the candidate received the degree, but also her or his 
research output (particularly in the form of publications) after graduation. 
Naturally, younger faculty members tended to have better credentials and 
have stronger research capability.
Many of the new PhDs have been hired by universities, and the proportion 
of PhDs in academic staﬀ has increased very rapidly (see table 10.3). How-
ever, the glut of PhDs made the job market prospects of the recent PhDs 
rather dismal. A peculiar trap resulting from this excess supply PhDs is the 
underemployed “part-  time instructor.” Most Korean universities, particu-
11. Korea maintains a compulsory military service for all men. Because of the post-  War 
baby boom, the military was not able to take all draftees. One principle that was accepted 
as the reason for the exemption of the service was the contribution to the nation in alterna-
tive way. Apparently, graduate-  level education in S&E was regarded to meet the criterion to 
policymakers.
Table 10.2  Earned doctoral degrees awarded in Korea




& engineering   Professional
Pre- 1965 563 15 3 40 505
1965 117 2 0 8 107
1970 407 7 6 62 329
1975 994 26 17 69 220
1980 528 54 50 168 300
1985 1,400 157 105 528 610
1990 2,747 439 340 1,137 831
1995 4,429 617 447 1,820 1,243
2000 6,555 746 679 3,148 1,982
2003 7,623 779 675 3,622 2,547
2006   9,314   952   858   4,320   3,184
Source: KMOE (various years), Education Statistics Yearbook.
Note: Humanities include literature, philosophy, and theology; social sciences include eco-
nomics, political science, business administration, and public administration; natural science 
and engineering also includes agriculture and ﬁ  shery; professional includes law, medicine, 
pharmacy, dentistry, oriental medicine, public health, nursing, home economics, and edu-
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larly private universities under strong incentives to reduce expenditure on 
teaching personnel, have relied heavily on cheap part-  time instructors.12 In 
2007, the number of full-  time academic staﬀ in four-  year universities was 
52,592, whereas the number of part-  time lectures in those institutions was 
59,848 (KEDI and MOE database). There has been a steady increase of 
part- time lecturers: in 2001, there were 38,050 part- time lecturers and 46,283 
full-  time academic staﬀ in four-  year universities (Kang and Paik 2005). In 
two-  year junior colleges, the situation is worse: that same year there were 
11,543 full-  time staﬀ and 22,180 part-  time lectures. This heavy reliance on 
part-  time lecturers became a serious structural problem in Korean higher 
education. Private universities used them to reduce the instruction costs, 
and even with a PhD, they cannot make a decent living. After investing so 
many years in schooling and for PhDs, part-  time instructors struggle with 
low earnings for many years, hoping eventually to secure full-  time teaching 
positions (W.-  Y. Kim 2008).13 Because of the slow turnover of the regular 
professorial positions and the sluggish expansion of new positions, the wait 
becomes longer every year.
The situation is worse for domestic PhDs because foreign PhDs typically 
have better reputations. In the academic year 2007, 4,749 new faculty mem-
bers were hired in four-  year universities, and 1,595 of them (42.5 percent) 
received their ﬁ  nal (mostly PhD) degrees abroad. In fact, the proportion of 
foreign PhDs has been increasing, not decreasing, steadily over the last few 
years. In 2002, it was only 34.6 percent. A similar pattern is found in two-
 year junior colleges: the proportion of new hires in the colleges with foreign 
degrees increased from 19.2 percent in 2002 to 28.7 percent in 2007.
12. Most part-  time instructors do not have other meaningful occupations, but teach several 
courses, sometimes in several schools simultaneously.
13. The issue of part-  time instructors has been surfaced to a social problem by the suicide 
of a long- time, part- time instructor at Seoul National University in June 2003. There has been 
an eﬀort to organize a labor union for part-  time instructors recently. For more information, 
visit  http:/ / www.kangno.com.
Table 10.3  Doctoral degree holders in four-  year colleges and universities in Korea
Full-  time teaching staﬀ Doctorate holders
  Year   (A)   (B)   B/A (%)  
1970 7,944 1,440 18.1
1975 10,242 2,807 27.4
1980 14,696 4,835 32.9
1985 26,459 9,090 34.3
1990 33,340 16,055 48.5
1995 45,087 26,771 5934
2000 41,943 34,666 82.7
2005 49,300 41,397 84.1
  2006   51,859   43,362   83.6  
Note: Full-  time teaching staﬀ before 1997 includes teaching assistants.354    Sunwoong  Kim
In 2002, full-  time, nontenure-  track instructors were introduced, and by 
2005, ﬁ  fty-  three universities had adopted this type of position. Although 
there are only 557 of them, the system became more popular, and in some 
universities, they account for more than 30 percent of the instruction staﬀ. 
Their working conditions are substantially worse than full-  time, tenure-
 track positions. They have lower salaries (50– 80 percent of the tenure- track 
counterpart) and heavier teaching loads (the majority of them have more 
than twelve credit hours per semester).
10.6      Drivers for Global Brain Competition (since 1997)
For the last two decades, the Korean higher education system became 
more deregulated and internationalized. Consequently, universities became 
more responsive to the changing market environment. Joong- Ang  Daily, 
one of the leading daily newspapers, now regularly publishes a Korean uni-
versity ranking similar to that produced by U.S. News and World Report. 
As the tuition fees of Korean universities, even the public universities, are 
quite substantial, students and parents are quite sensitive to the education 
value of the universities. The recent sharp decline of the age cohort of col-
lege going age despite of large expansion of higher education system has 
also encouraged many universities to actively recruit students. Attractive 
academic programs and star faculty members in addition to better student 
services became major tools for student recruitment.
As the Korean economy continued to grow, study abroad became more 
aﬀordable and popular. In addition to traditional graduate students, a 
growing number of Korean students go abroad for their undergraduate de-
grees or intensive language courses (particularly English). According to a 
recent study done by the Korea Trade Association, the number of Korean 
students seeking degrees or language training abroad in 2003 was about 
350,000. The amount they spent in one year was estimated at about 4.6 
billion U.S. dollars, which is about a quarter of the budget of the Korea 
Ministry of Education and Human Resources.14 There has been a steep in-
crease in these numbers.
The excess supply of PhDs, increased competition among universities, 
and the mass internationalization of higher education generated a changing 
environment in the higher education sector, and major stakeholders actively 
sought better market opportunities. Individual PhDs need to adjust to the 
professorial labor market with increasingly greater supply. At the same 
time, they want to look for a better professional and personal environment 
when they decide where to live, as Korea’s income increases and the country 
becomes more integrated with the global economy. Universities want to 
improve their reputations in order to attract better students and academic 
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staﬀ. The government and businesses seek ways to move the economy to an 
increasingly more knowledge-  based economy. Since the early 1990s, they 
recognized the importance of research and development in S&E as the new 
engine of economic growth. The IMD’s ranking of national competitiveness 
has been adopted as the new objective of the government interventions in the 
economy. Additional resources to and institutional reform in higher educa-
tion became important priorities in the national agenda. We shall discuss 
these various aspects in more detail in what follows.
10.6.1      Mass Internationalization of Higher Education
Internationalization of higher education promotes the competition in the 
Korean higher education system. While there are as yet no credible foreign 
institutions that eﬀectively compete with top Korean universities in Korea, 
many top high school students opt to study at elite U.S. universities. Cur-
rently, there are about 150,000 Korean students enrolled in higher learn-
ing institutions abroad. Out of these students, about 60,000 (40 percent) 
are in the United States. Other popular destinations are English speaking 
countries, such as Canada and Australia, which take an additional 30,000 
students. Moreover, increasing numbers of primary and secondary school 
students are seeking study abroad.
The trend of early study abroad is motivated by the dissatisfaction over 
the current secondary education system. Korea regularly attains one of the 
highest ranks in standardized international tests of academic achievements 
such as the Trends in International Math and Science Study (TIMSS) and 
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA).15 However, many 
parents and educational specialists are concerned about the level of edu-
cation spending. In 2003, the government spent 3.5 percent of GDP on 
primary and secondary education, a relative size of public expenditure that 
is in line with other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) countries. At the same time, the household sector spends an 
additional 3.2 percent of GDP (2.3 percent in private tutoring and 0.9 per-
cent for high school tuition payments, textbooks, and other teaching mate-
rial) in primary and secondary education (Kim and Lee 2010). In addition 
15. The International Associations for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) 
conducts standardized achievement tests in about ﬁ  fty countries and reports the results as 
TIMSS since 1995. Korea’s scores have been consistently at the top. According to the latest 
reported tests conducted in 2003, Korea ranked the second in math and the third in science 
among forty-  four countries that participated in the tests. Another well-  known international 
test is PISA, conducted by the OECD. While TIMSS tries to measure scholarly achievements 
based on the standard curricular material, PISA tries to measure more applied ability such 
as problem-  solving skills. Korea ranks very highly in PISA as well. In 2003 tests, ﬁ  fteen-  year 
old Korean students ranked number one in problem solving, ranked second in reading, third 
in math, and fourth in science among forty countries where the tests were conducted. The 
dispersion of the test scores of Korean students is known relatively small, and this ﬁ  nding was 
considered as that Korean education system not only produces high average academic achieve-
ments but more equalized outcomes than most OECD countries.356    Sunwoong  Kim
to the resulting ﬁ  nancial burden, Korean secondary students spend an inor-
dinate amount of time in private tutoring in addition to regular schooling. 
The heavy ﬁ  nancial and emotional costs of education translate into genuine 
dislike for schools. Another major dissatisfaction over the secondary edu-
cational system is that it emphasizes rote memorization over creativity and 
critical thinking. Consequently, many upper-  middle-  class households are 
willing to take their children out of the Korean system and send them to 
foreign countries to study. While the eﬀectiveness of this growing early study 
abroad is not certain, its socioeconomic costs are not trivial.
In an attempt to reduce the education deﬁ  cit, estimated to be between US 
$3 to 10 billion a year, the Korean government has been trying to attract for-
eign universities and research institutions into the 52,000 acre Incheon Free 
Trade Zone by giving generous incentives such as rent-  free buildings and 
tax- free land. The State University of New York (SUNY), Stony Brook and 
North Carolina State University have signed agreements to operate degree 
programs and research projects, and the University of Southern California 
(USC), George Mason, and George Washington University are reportedly 
in the process of negotiation (Chronicle of Higher Education, March 21, 
2008, vol. 54, no. 28).
At the same time, more English-  only institutions are starting to operate. 
Underwood College of Yonsei University started its operation by attract-
ing Korean and foreign students. Virtually all major universities oﬀer some 
classes exclusively taught in English, and some programs or schools are 
planning to oﬀer all classes in English. Most major Korean universities have 
exchange programs that send students abroad regularly.
However, the Korean push for internationalization of its higher educa-
tion institutions has not produced any noticeable changes in inbound inter-
nationalization. In the 2007 Ministry of Education Survey, twenty-  three 
public universities employed a total of only twenty-  two full-  time foreign 
professors. Private universities have hundreds of foreign professors, but most 
of them are English instructors. Korean universities have tried to attract 
foreign students, but the result is rather dismal. There are only 22,000 for-
eign students in Korea, compared to about 100,000 in Japan. Kim (2005) 
observed that despite the oﬃcial goal of “30% of academic staﬀ by 2005,” 
the bureaucratic rules have not been updated. For example, a rule that only 
Korean scholars are allowed to receive research grants from Korea Research 
Foundation was on the books until 2008. Cultural and bureaucratic exclu-
sion of the small number of foreign faculty members were common.
10.6.2      Reform Initiatives by Universities
The massive outbound internationalization of students and increased 
competition among institutions encouraged some innovative academic ad-
ministrators to implement a variety of reform measures, including more 
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visibility publications. In 2000, Seoul National University (SNU) asked 
a blue ribbon commission, composed of internationally known scholars 
and academic administrators, to review the university and to provide rec-
ommendations to make SNU a world-  class university. The commission’s 
recommendations (Seoul National University 2001) were quite relevant in 
pointing out the malaise of SNU and other Korean universities in general. 
The ﬁ  rst set of recommendations concerned the governance structure of 
SNU. Instead of having the university president elected through direct vote 
among faculty, it recommended the establishment of an independent board 
of directors, which would appoint the president for a longer (or indetermi-
nate) term of oﬃce. Also, it recommended more rigorous review of the pro-
gram and faculty. Up until then, the rate of granting tenure in SNU was 100 
percent, and there was no eﬀective program review. Without such reviews, 
it was natural to expect the quality of research and teaching at SNU to be 
mediocre. Third, it recommended that resources should be allocated based 
on merit and scholarly excellence.
By and large, many top-  rung universities recognize their weakness and 
have tried to improve their competitiveness in a more globalized higher edu-
cation market. Since the late 1990s, several private universities started to 
introduce performance-  based pay for faculty, a marked change from pre-
vious practice in which salaries were rarely based on market rates across 
disciplines or individual performance within the department. The faculty 
reaction to this new pay system was decidedly mixed. Predictably, the faculty 
in humanities and social sciences objected, while those in medical schools, 
business schools, and other popular disciplines usually welcomed the new 
scheme, as did younger faculty (Na 2000).
The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 to 1998 sounded a wake-  up call to 
the Korean economy. In order to increase proﬁ  tability, many private-  sector 
ﬁ  rms abandoned the lifetime employment policy. After observing massive 
restructuring and wholesale lay oﬀs during the crisis, many Korean pro-
fessionals no longer viewed the jobs in Korea as a lifetime commitment. 
Realizing that they could lose their jobs at a whim unless they upgraded 
themselves continuously, workers started to view individual performance as 
more important than organizational harmony and company loyalty.
The changes in personnel policies in the private sector started to inﬂ  u-
ence higher education institutions. Until the early 1990s, faculty positions 
had been rationed by the availability of the PhDs and the ranking of the 
university where the candidate received his or her PhD. Beginning in 2002, 
regulations regarding the personnel policy of professors shifted, allowing 
universities to have explicit contracts with individual professors similar to 
those in the United States. Since then, some professors were given tenure, 
some were given probationary contracts with tenure evaluation (tenure 
track), and other others were given temporary contracts (adjunct or part-
 time lecturers). In most universities, the tenure evaluation occurs some years 358    Sunwoong  Kim
after the faculty member is appointed as full professor. The new person-
nel policy change has been gradually taken seriously, particularly by top 
research universities. For example, in the 2007 tenure evaluation, KAIST 
dropped ﬁ  fteen out of thirty- ﬁ  ve applicants (43 percent). Such a low success 
rate had been unheard of in Korea. However, the strict tenure evaluation 
policy pushed by the KAIST President Dr. Suh Nam- Pyo, a long- time MIT 
professor in mechanical engineering, has been reluctantly accepted by the 
faculty. However, his predecessor, a physics Nobel Laureate from Stanford, 
failed to be reappointed, owing to the opposition of the faculty when he tried 
to impose more selective faculty research support. Although the ultimate 
success of KAIST’s stricter tenure policy remains to be seen, many top uni-
versities, including SNU, seem to have adopted substantially tighter tenure 
requirements recently.
Faculty mobility among universities in Korea is increasing, as universities 
are more willing to outbid others in order to attract better faculty members. 
According to Son (2007), among the 1,135 hires in the 182 universities in 
the fall 2005 semester, 213 (18.9 percent) were transfers from one university 
to the other. This type of lateral move had been very rare in the previous 
environment in which seniority and loyalty were regarded a more impor-
tant consideration than the individual record of performance in the hiring 
process.
While the incentive pay scheme and more rigorous tenure evaluations have 
been accepted gradually, the governance structure turned out to be much 
more diﬃcult to implement. The governance structure of national universi-
ties is still highly bureaucratic. The faculty and administrative staﬀs are civil 
servants, and their personnel matters (appointment, promotion, salary, and 
so on) are managed by the government, not by the president of the univer-
sity. In most cases, the president is elected by a popular vote by the faculty. 
Consequently, their tenure is relatively short (typically four years), and they 
are not able to formulate or implement any measures of substance. The level 
of autonomy by individual university is rather limited. In this environment, 
it is diﬃcult to expect universities to adopt innovative measures to make 
their institutions more eﬃcient.
The diﬃculty of institutional reform in university governance can be seen 
at KAIST as well. Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology is 
a public university founded by the Ministry of Science and Technology in 
1971, not by the Ministry of Education that supervises most of the national 
universities and provides funding. In this regard, KAIST is diﬀerent from a 
typical national university. Its aim, from the beginning, was to be a world-
 class research university that specializes in science and technology. The basic 
rationales for establishing the institution were ﬁ  rst, science and technology 
would be one of the most important determinants of economic growth in 
the future; and second, the Ministry of Science and Technology would be 
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heavy regulation imposed by the Ministry of Education on other national 
universities. Its basic model of operation is heavy government subsidy of 
elite students with an emphasis on graduate education, particularly PhDs. 
In order to attract the best students, KAIST charged no tuition. At the same 
time, KAIST hired top- notch faculty, many of whom had advanced degrees 
from top research universities in the United States, with the expectation of 
high research productivity and minimal teaching loads. In 2004, KAIST 
hired a Nobel Laureate in physics, Dr. Robert B. Laughlin from Stanford 
University, as the president. The goal of hiring Dr. Laughlin, who had no 
prior administrative experience, was to provide credibility to the in-stitution 
as a world-  class research university.
This hiring of a non- Korean reﬂ  ected the national sentiment that foreign 
experts would be better able to adopt revolutionary reform to improve the 
eﬃciency of the organization because they have no existing ties to domestic 
stakeholders whose interests might be jeopardized by reform. The success 
of Mr. Gus Hiddink, who led the Korean soccer team to the quarterﬁ  nals 
of the 2002 World Cup, was an inspiration for such bold recruiting eﬀorts 
at the executive level.
However, the rosy expectations of Hiddink-  like institutional reform at 
KAIST were not realized. On the contrary, there was a tremendous backlash 
against the Laughlin strategy. President Laughlin suggested that in order 
to become an elite university (such as MIT or Stanford), KAIST should 
be privatized. For a physicist, his analysis was surprisingly economic. The 
original KAIST model, he suggested, would not be sustainable, as the gov-
ernment budget allocation would never be enough for KAIST to compete 
eﬀectively among the major research universities in the world. The emphasis 
on graduate education at KAIST, which is expensive to maintain, would not 
be sustainable without the cross-  subsidy from the tuition revenues gener-
ated by undergraduate students attracted by the prominent faculty members 
and the reputation of the institution. Also, he wanted to have more diverse 
undergraduate programs (with substantial tuition fees), which are attractive 
to a wide variety of talented undergraduate students, not just techies and 
nerds. In order to attract such tuition- paying students, KAIST’s undergrad-
uate programs would need to be responsive to the market demand. These 
are the reasons why he wanted to privatize KAIST.
The proposal was not well received at all, as there were no key stakehold-
ers who were willing to support such drastic change. Faculty did not like the 
more market- oriented structure and the subsequent unequal distribution of 
resources within the institution. Students fear a big hike in tuition and fees. 
The government does not want to lose the control of the institution. The 
widespread dissatisfaction with Laughlin’s leadership featured an open letter 
from twenty department heads threatening to resign if Laughlin remained. 
In 2007, the KAIST board did not renew Laughlin’s contract.
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versities proposed by the Ministry of Education in 2007. The basic idea of 
this reform is to create an independent board for each national university 
along the lines of a Japanese law passed in 2003 that created an individual 
board of trustees responsible for the operation of each university. The law 
also establishes endowments from the government in the form of land, build-
ing, and other assets. The Korean Ministry of Education has been hold-
ing various focus group meetings, but the general reaction has been quite 
negative.
10.6.3      Government Programs: Limited Success 
but with Steep Learning Curve
The Korean government’s investment in higher education has been very 
minimal due to the historical legacy of ambitious plan for the programs of 
universal primary education and secondary school equalization. These two 
previous initiatives, in eﬀect, precommitted the government’s educational 
resources. Given the large number of primary and secondary students in 
the school system, the government simply did not have enough resources 
available for the higher education sector. However, as the number of recent 
students in primary and secondary schools decreased, the government in-
creasingly had more resources available for higher education. In addition, 
the need for a competitive higher education sector has become apparent for 
this country that does not have many natural resources. Thus, the govern-
ment has undertaken for the last two decades policy initiatives for upgrading 
the competitiveness of Korea’s higher education sector. However, because 
Korean law bans successive ﬁ  ve-  year terms for the president, the govern-
ment’s policy often serves short-  term visibility at the expense of long-  term 
capacity building, and even those attempts have been manipulated by power-
ful stakeholders to protect and further their interests.
Korea has a long tradition of government control over the economy, 
including the higher education sector. Although government regulations 
have been relaxed over time, it still maintains great control over the higher 
education sector by operating public universities, distributing resources, and 
enforcing regulations. The professors and administrative staﬀs in national 
universities are appointed by the government and regarded as civil servants. 
Therefore, the president of the university lacks the power to hire and ﬁ  re 
workers in the university, making the personnel policy one of the most rigid 
aspects of the Korean public university system. Because the government 
provides substantial resources to public universities (about 30 percent of 
the total expenditure), its annual budget allocation substantially inﬂ  uences 
the ﬁ  scal capability of public universities. At the same time, the govern-
ment successfully fended oﬀ the request of private universities to support 
their operational budget, and the government does not have any direct ﬁ  scal 
responsibility to support private universities. The only government funding 
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designed with speciﬁ  c policy objectives. Over the years, the government has 
instituted many higher education policies. The following are the most note-
worthy.
Brain Pool Program (1994–  Present)
Initiated in 1994 during the Kim Young-  Sam (1992–  1997) Administra-
tion, the Brain Pool program allows Korean researchers to invite foreign 
talents (mostly Korean expatriates) for short stays, rather than the longer 
visits supported by previous brain gain programs. Another characteristic 
of the program is its emphasis on established researchers, on the principle 
that brand-  new PhDs, albeit their excellent training, are not particularly 
productive, owing to their relative inexperience in setting up independent 
cutting-  edge research programs and their lack of familiarity with local 
research environments. Through the program, researchers at universities 
and research institutes invite foreign researchers (with at least ﬁ  ve years 
of experience) for a ﬁ  xed-  time (three months to two years) to carry out 
joint research. The program supports the invitee’s salary, living, and travel 
expanses. While the program aims for already established researchers, how-
ever, the level of support is small (e.g., up to $2,000 per month salary), and 
host institutions have been reluctant to put in substantial cost-  sharing to 
invite established researchers. At the same time, an established researcher 
in the United States would be reluctant leave for Korea while sacriﬁ  cing the 
progress of his or her ongoing research activities. Consequently, the program 
has not been able to attract active researchers who are in the middle of ac-
tive research activities as intended. Instead, most of the invitees have been 
either young postdocs who would like to go back to Korea, but do not have 
ﬁ  rm employment prospects, or retirees who would like to spend some time 
in Korea. However, many Korean professors used this program for expand-
ing their publication eﬀort in international journals. Although the program 
has changed somewhat and the level of funding has declined over the years, 
it is still being maintained.
Brain Korea 21 (1999–  2012)
During the next Kim Dae-  Jung Administration (1998–  2002), an ambi-
tious government initiative to promote research universities and graduate 
education was launched. The motivation of this program was the realization 
that the top Korean universities were losing their top students to top U.S. 
universities. Recognizing the prospect that obtaining a PhD at a top Korean 
university will not generate a promising career, many talented Korean stu-
dents either pursue lucrative nonacademic careers (such as business manage-
ment, medical, and legal professions) or go to the United States for further 
study. By the early 1990s, the faculties in top Korean universities were ﬁ  lled 
with PhDs from top U.S. research universities.
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Korean graduate education. The basic design of the program was to select 
a handful of research groups (three to six, depending on subjects) and sup-
port their graduate programs. During Phase I (1999– 2005), BK21 allocated 
about US $1.4 billion, and in Phase II (2006–  2012), an additional US $2.1 
billion was allocated. The bulk of the funding went to graduate student 
tuition, stipends, travel, and research allowances, although the program also 
allows some limited funding for faculty. While the program’s explicit objec-
tive was for education (i.e., graduate education), the selection criteria heavily 
rely on the participating faculty group’s aggregated research output. The 
basic rationale for selecting research groups rather than individuals was to 
“concentrate” resources on “substantial size” programs.
Despite the opposition by many active research professors who work 
outside of the top research universities, the plan was implemented. Predict-
ably, the main beneﬁ  ciary of the program was the small group of large top 
research universities such as Seoul National University, KAIST, POSTECH, 
Yonsei University, and Korea University. Approximately 500 programs, cov-
ering 25 percent of all graduate students in science and technology and 5 
percent of those in humanities and social sciences, were supported by the 
program. Seoul National University was awarded about 20 percent of the 
total allocation.
Dr. Zhang-  Hee Cho, Professor of Radiological Science at the Univer-
sity of California, Irvine, and a member of the U.S. National Academy of 
Sciences, heavily criticized the design of the program. While he had been 
involved substantially in the public policy formulation of the science and 
engineering policies in the previous administration, he argued that the gov-
ernment’s initiative lacked the main ingredient of the research university: 
hiring talented researchers. In evaluating the BK21 program, Seong et al. 
(2008) suggested that although supporting the department as a unit may 
have some merits, individual graduate students should be the main ben-
eﬁ  ciaries so that they can take the fellowship and choose the university to 
attend rather than channel the resource to the university in order to attract 
students.
New University for Regional Innovation (NURI) Program (2004–  Present)
In 2004, during the next Roh Moo-  Hyun Administration (2003–  2007), 
the NURI Program was launched. The Roh Administration’s top policy 
agenda was balanced regional development. With about a quarter of Korea’s 
population and more than a half of its GDP, the Seoul Metropolitan area 
dominates the country’s economy. Because the administration regarded the 
heavy concentration of higher education in the area as an impediment to 
the nation’s healthy economic growth, the NURI Program was designed to 
strengthen the capability of universities located outside of this populous 
region so that they could be the pillar of regional innovation. The program 
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local government and industry. The NURI Program was operated jointly 
with BK21 so that all universities compete in BK21, and only the ones out-
side of the Seoul region compete in NURI.
World Class University
The new Lee Myung-  Bak Administration (2008–  2013) is starting the 
World-  Class University (WCU) Program with a budget of $850 million 
between 2008 and 2012. The objective of this program is to recruit top-
 notch faculty members (Koreans as well as non- Koreans) permanently into 
Korean universities in the ﬁ  elds of emerging technologies and interdisciplin-
ary programs. The program subsidizes the salary of the recruit up to US 
$200,000 per year for ﬁ  ve years, after which the host university is expected 
to cover the full expense. The program also allows these faculty members 
to be part time or full time. Because the Program has not yet started as of 
2008, its eﬀects remain to be seen.
Besides the concern for the eﬀectiveness of the top Korean universities 
in the national economy, the most recent government program was heav-
ily motivated by the recent hoopla of the world rankings on universities, 
such as Academic Rankings of World Universities by Shanhai Jiatong Uni-
versity started in 2003 and Times Higher Education-  Quacqarelli Symonds 
(THE- QS) World University Rankings published in Times Higher Education 
supplements started in 2004. Other rankings of world universities prolifer-
ated by trying to address several criticisms of those rankings.16 The Korean 
government took those world rankings seriously as it tried to move up the 
ladder of advanced countries. By focusing on the indicators used in those 
well- known rankings, the current administration wanted to improve domes-
tic and international public relations. Other nations such as China and Sin-
gapore have already adopted a national objective to improve top domestic 
universities at the level of world- renowned major research universities. The 
Korean government does not want to be left behind in this international 
competition of global prominence in top universities. The worldwide reputa-
tion of their top universities can satisfy the collective ethos of their citizens 
who want to be recognized as one of the leading nations in the world as such 
desire cannot be satisﬁ  ed only through the success in major sporting events 
such as the Olympics or the World Cup soccer tournament.
Overall, the eﬀects of these government initiatives have been mixed. On 
one hand, they provide a strong medium for reform because they are con-
sidered major discretionary resources that universities can utilize. The in-
centives and evaluations that they provide gave institutions strong signals 
of the government’s objectives. On the other hand, government programs 
16. Shanghai Jiatong rankings are mainly based on research outputs such as publications in 
peer review articles and research, Nobel prizes, and so on, which favor institutions in English-
  speaking countries, particularly the United States. The THE- QS relies heavily on reputation 
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have been driven by short- term political objectives that are prone to change 
from administration to administration. Another major problem is that the 
government-  led initiatives have been ill-  targeted because they are designed 
and managed by bureaucrats who do not know exactly how research uni-
versities operate.
As the experience of the successive rounds of government programs accu-
mulates, the program design becomes more compatible with incentive struc-
tures of the major stakeholders. While most of the government programs 
in general favor the insiders of the system (i.e., government bureaucracies 
and major universities), the evaluation process in which the beneﬁ  ciaries are 
determined becomes more transparent. Also, the amount of resources set 
aside for the programs becomes large enough to attract international talents 
who may be able to make a diﬀerence in shaping the culture of the Korean 
academic community.
10.6.4      Aspiration for Global Prominence and 
Globalized Professorial Market
During the past ten years, Korea’s research output and capability have 
increased substantially. The number of published articles in Science Cita-
tion Index (SCI)- indexed journals has jumped from 9,444 in 1998 to 23,515 
in 2005. In terms of world ranking based on number of publications, 
Korea’s rank has risen from eighteenth in 1998 to twelfth in 2005. Kim 
(2007) reports that the research output of SNU, Korea’s ﬂ  agship research 
institution among comprehensive universities, has grown to become quite 
substantial and comparable to major U.S. public universities. According to 
him, the number of articles indexed in the SCI by SNU professors ranked 
seventy- ﬁ  fth in the world in 1999, and jumped to thirty-  ﬁ  rst in 2004 with 
3,116 articles. In the same year, Harvard ranked number 1 with 9,421 articles, 
followed by Tokyo University with 6,631, and the University of California 
Los Angeles (UCLA) with 5,232. Seoul National University’s total research 
funding in the same year reached US $270 million, which is quite com-
parable to Harvard’s $648 million, Tokyo University’s $426 million, and 
UCLA’s $611 million. While the quality of its articles was not comparable 
to those universities, SNU’s overall quality of publications has improved a 
great deal. Measured by the number of citations in SCI, SNU’s quality was 
35 percent of the “top three” universities in the United States and 53 percent 
of the “high-  ranking (top 20 to 30)” U.S. universities in 1999. The measure 
in 2004 has also jumped to 74 percent of the “top three” and 137 percent of 
“high- ranking”  universities.
While these measures of research quantity and quality are not perfect, 
they show a pattern of great progress for Korea’s top universities. Although 
there exists a great deal of institutional rigidity and the fundamental gover-
nance structure is unlikely to change in the near future, the changed incentive 
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ated a substantial shift toward more research orientation. While the bulk of 
those research products may not be creative and high impact at the world’s 
highest level, Korea’s research capability has been improving greatly during 
the last ten years or so. Some authors like Leydesdorﬀ and Zhou (2005) have 
predicted that China and Korea will become the new science and engineering 
research powerhouses in the near future.
Certainly, the competition for top researchers has increased recently. 
Korean universities and research institutes are now willing (and able) to pay 
comparable (and higher) wages compared with top research universities in 
the United States, thus intensifying the global competition for talents. How-
ever, as the domestic professorial market deteriorates over time, along with 
more stringent career prospects and tougher tenure evaluations and promo-
tion, more and more U.S.- trained Korean PhDs are opting to stay away from 
Korea, at least immediately after receiving the degree. Market salaries for 
fresh PhDs have plummeted, but those of the world-  class researchers have 
gone up. Therefore, young PhDs are likely to start out their professional 
careers in the United States or any other place in the world that can sus-
tain their research activities (Kim 2004; Jin et al. 2006). The percentage of 
Korean doctorates who intend to stay in the United States after the comple-
tion of their degree increased from 58.4 percent in 2000 to 63.0 percent in 
2006 (Hoﬀer et al. 2007). Among the Korean S&E PhDs (including social 
sciences), the “intend to stay rate” has gradually increased from 32.7 percent 
in 1992 to 68.8 percent in 2005 (data provided by Michael Finn [2007]). The 
percentage of Korean S&E PhDs who have deﬁ  nite plans for U.S. employ-
ment has increased from 3.0 percent in 1993 to 12.1 percent in 2005. The stay 
rate in the United States of Korean S&E PhDs ﬁ  ve years after graduation 
for 1992 to 1993 doctorate recipients was only 9 percent, and the proportion 
has increased to 42 percent for 2000 doctorate recipients.
Also, employment prospects of American-  trained PhDs in third coun-
tries such as Singapore, Australia, Hong Kong, the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, and other European countries are increasing. More and more 
universities in those countries are willing to hire professors without the local 
language expertise because English is or becomes the main medium in teach-
ing. It is not totally clear who stays in the United States, who goes to the third 
country, and who decides to go back. However, such decision will surely be 
dependent on personal as well as professional considerations.17 Regarding 
the former, the United States and Korea generally oﬀer better environments 
than a third country. For most young doctorate recipients, Korea oﬀers 
familiarity and opportunities to be close to relatives and friends, and the 
United States oﬀers a better environment in which to educate their chil-
17. Unlike their older colleagues who had grown up in tougher economic situations, the new 
generation enjoyed more comfortable material lives and tended to be more individualistic and 
to value quality of family life over a more fulﬁ  lling career. Many of these people viewed the 
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dren. In terms of professional opportunities, it may be diﬃcult to generalize 
because it is not only the job itself, but the connectivity to the wider research 
community that is important. For some, Korea may oﬀer better opportu-
nities because of the future prospects. For others, the United States may 
oﬀer better working environments by being able to be connect to the larger 
professional community (Miyagiwa 1991).
10.7      Conclusions: What Does It Mean for American Universities?
Despite its relatively small population size and substantial geographical 
distance to the United States, Korea has been sending a large number of 
students to U.S. universities over the last few decades. How many and what 
kind of these students come to the United States and go back to Korea 
after their education and training? As many of the graduates, particularly 
PhDs, engage in research and teaching, these questions are very important 
in gauging the potential for the competitiveness of U.S. universities as well 
as of Korean universities.
Over the last decades, the number and the quality of these students 
changed quite dramatically. At the same time, the relationship between the 
graduates and U.S. universities has changed substantially depending on 
what is happening in Korea. When Korea was a low-  income country and 
the potential for a successful professional career within Korea was bleak, 
most of the talents from Korea stayed in the United States after their higher 
education and training in the United States. This pattern of brain drain 
is similar to the current situation of the students from China and India. 
However, when Korea began to actively recruit the talented expatriates to 
promote economic growth and the development of higher education sec-
tor and the career prospects of the returnees improved, the majority of the 
Korean expatriates started to return home. A pattern of active brain gain 
by virtually outsourcing graduate education was established. Many talented 
and promising students came to the United States for graduate studies and 
returned home to work in Korea. Based on this experience, many Chinese 
and Indian talents educated and trained in the United States may start to go 
back to their home countries on a large scale when the economic conditions 
of their homelands are more amenable to these U.S.-  trained professionals.
While the full-  scale outsourcing of graduate education will fade away 
as the quality of teaching and the research capacity of Korean universities 
improve, large- scale study abroad of Korean students to the American uni-
versities is likely to continue in the near future. As long as the top American 
universities maintain their worldwide reputations, they will continuously 
attract top Korean graduate students. In addition to the attraction repre-
sented by the great global reputation of the top American research universi-
ties, a large number of Korean undergraduate and high school students will 
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tionalization of higher education and the dissatisfaction with the Korean 
education system.
Recent changes are likely to encourage more Korean talents to seek em-
ployment opportunities in the United States after their education and train-
ing. Rapid increases in the supply of PhDs, particularly within Korea, have 
made job prospects in Korea less promising. As the seniority-  based per-
sonnel policy gave away to a more merit-  based system, Korean universities 
started to demand research output in the form of publications and patents 
rather than just the degrees from prestigious universities. In this environ-
ment, promising young Korean scholars and researchers favor more pro-
ductive research environments, at least at the beginning of their careers. As 
long as the research environment of the American universities is more favor-
able than those of other nations, they will continuously attract top Korean 
researchers. Recently, with the government initiatives and increasing market 
pressure, Korean top universities have improved their research output and 
working environments tremendously. While the quality and the impact of 
their research output may not yet reach the level of the top research uni-
versities in the United States, the gap has narrowed quickly during the last 
decade.
As Korean professors become more active in the international scholarly 
community, the interaction between Korean and American universities will 
become more complex and frequent. In the earlier brain drain phase, Korea 
simply provided talented students to the U.S. universities. In the brain gain 
phase, Korean students earned graduate degrees and returned home to work 
and teach there. In the new phase of brain competition, Korean academics 
will have more cooperation and competition with their U.S. colleagues in 
joint research projects. To American universities, Korea will provide not 
only graduate students but undergraduate students and post-  docs. Also, 
there will be more lateral moves among Korean expatriates across the na-
tional border temporarily or permanently. More Korean professors will be 
incorporated into the wider U.S. and international community of scholars 
who compete and cooperate with one another at the same time.
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